Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2015

The Obsolete Theory of Crown Unity in Canada and Its Relevance
to Indigenous Claims
Kent McNeil
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, kmcneil@osgoode.yorku.ca

Source Publication:
(2015) 20 Review of Constitutional Studies 1-29

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons

Repository Citation
McNeil, Kent, "The Obsolete Theory of Crown Unity in Canada and Its Relevance to Indigenous Claims"
(2015). Articles & Book Chapters. 2777.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works/2777

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital
Commons.

The Obsolete Theory of Crown Unity in
Canada and Its Relevance to Indigenous
Claims
Kent McNeil*
This article examines the application of the
theory ofthe unity ofthe Crown in Canadain
the context of Indigenous peoples. It reveals a
consistent retreat by the courtsfrom acceptance
of the theory in the late nineteenth century to
rejection ofit in the secondhalfofthe twentieth
century. This evolution ofthe theory' relevance,
it is argued, is consistent with Canada
structure and eventual independence from
the United Kingdom. However, in a startling
reversal, the Supreme Court reverted to the
theory in its 2014judgment in Grassy Narrows
First Nation v Ontario (Minister of Natural
Resources) to support its decision that the
provinces have control over natural resource
development in the areas of Canada that are
covered by the numbered treaties.

federal

L'uteur de cet article examine l'pplication
de la theorie de Punite de la Couronne
au Canada dans le contexte des peuples
autochtones. I rivile une retraite constante
de la part des tribunaux de lipprobation de
la theorie la fin du dix-neuvidme sicle
son rejet au cours de la deuxidme moiti du
vingtidme sidcle. I soutient que cette evolution
de la pertinence de la theorie correspond au
regime fideral canadien et son indipendance
ultime du Royaume-Uni. Cependant, dans un
renversement surprenant, la Cour suprime est
retournee la theorie dans son arrit de 2014
dans Premidre Nation de Grassy Narrows
c. Ontario (Ressources Naturelles) pour
appuyer sa decision voulant que les provinces
ont l'utoritisur lexploitation des ressources
naturelles dans les zones du Canadafaisant
l'objet de traitsnumirotrs.

a

a

a

Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I am grateful to Michael Asch, Robert Janes, Rarihokwats, Kathy Simo, Roger Townshend,
James Tully, and Kerry Wilkins for reading a draft of this article and providing me with very helpful comments. This article
examines the theory of Crown unity from the perspective of Canadian constitutional law. I acknowledge that Indigenous peoples
in Canada may have very different perspectives, especially where their treaty relationship with the Crown is concerned. The notion
that the nation-to-nation treaties they entered into with the Queen or King of the British Empire were somehow unilaterally
transformed into domestic treaties with the Crown in Canada as a result of constitutional evolution, as determined by case law
discussed in this article, may be unacceptable. I would like to thank MichaelAsch for reminding me of this.

I

The Obsolete Theory of Crown Unity in Canada and Its Relevance to Indigenous Claims
For the King has in him two Bodies, viz., a Body natural and a Body politic ....

[T]he Body

politic includes the Body natural, but the Body naturalis the lesser, and with this the Body politic is
consolidated. So that he has ... a Body naturaland a Body politic together indivisible;and these two
bodies are incorporatedin one Person, and make one Body and not diverse, that is the Body corporate
in the Body natural, et e contra the Body naturalin the Body corporate.
Case of the Duchy of Lancaster (1562) 1 Plowden's Reports 212
Her Majesty ' a pretty nice girl
But she changesfom day to day.
John Lennon and Paul McCartney (1969)

The orthodox theory is well-known and used to be generally accepted: there is
only one Crown in Canada, though the Crown acts through various ministers
and other officials at both the federal and provincial levels of government. But,
does this theory make sense? Who or what exactly is the Crown? Does the
Crown have legal personality and, if so, on what basis? Moreover, what impact
has the theory had on the Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Indigenous peoples
of Canada? The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Grassy
Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Ministerof Natural Resources)' provides some
insight into the last question, revealing that the theory's impact on Indigenous
rights tends to be negative.
Grassy Narrows First Nation involved Treaty 3, entered into in 1873
between "Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland,
by her Commissioners, . . . and the Saulteaux Tribe of Ojibbeway Indians,
inhabitants of the country within the limits hereinafter defined and described,
by their Chiefs." 2 A clause of the treaty provides:
Her Majesty further agrees with her said Indians, that they, the said Indians,
shall have [the] right to pursue their avocations of hunting and fishing
throughout the tract surrendered as hereinbefore described, subject to such
regulations as may from time to time be made by her Government of her
Dominion of Canada, and saving and excepting such tracts as may, from time
to time, be required or taken up for settlement, mining, lumbering or other
purposes, by her said Government of the Dominion of Canada, or by any of
the subjects thereof duly authorized therefor by the said Government.

1
2

2014 SCC 48, 372 DLR (4th) 385 [Grassy Narrows FirstNation].
Treaty 3, in Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canadawith the Indians ofManitoba and the NorthWest Territories (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke & Co, 1880, reprinted Toronto: Coles Publishing
Company, 1979), 320-26 at 320, online: <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1 100100028675/11001000
286Z9>.

3

Ibid at 323.
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The main issue in Grassy Narrows FirstNation was whether the takingup authority in this clause could be exercised by the government of Ontario,
without the government of Canada's participation or consent, after the lands in
question were included in the Province of Ontario by the northern extension
of Ontario's boundary in 1912.' In a unanimous judgment delivered by Chief
Justice McLachlin, the Supreme Court decided that Ontario, and Ontario
alone, can take up Treaty 3 lands within the province, as long as the government
of Ontario consults with the First Nations whose rights would be affected
and accommodates them in appropriate circumstances.' There is no role for
Canada in this process. If, however, "the taking up leaves the Ojibway with no
meaningful right to hunt, fish or trap in relation to the territories over which
they traditionally hunted, fished, and trapped, a potential action for treaty
infringement will arise."'
In deciding that Ontario alone can take up lands, McLachlin CJC
implicitly endorsed the concept of the unity of the Crown: "although Treaty
3 was negotiated by the federal government, it is an agreement between the
Ojibway and the Crown. The level of government that exercises or performs the
rights and obligations under the treaty is determined by the division of powers
in the Constitution."7 In reaching this conclusion, she cited the opinion of the
Privy Council in St. Catherine' Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen,'
where, she said, "Lord Watson concluded that Treaty 3 purported to be 'from
beginning to end a transaction between the Indians and the Crown', not an
agreement between the government of Canada and the Ojibway people." In
another passage, the Chief Justice put it this way:
The view that only Canada can take up, or authorize the taking up of, lands
under Treaty 3 rests on a misconception of the legal role of the Crown in the
treaty context. It is true that Treaty 3 was negotiated with the Crown in right
of Canada. But that does not mean that the Crown in right of Ontario is not
bound by and empowered to act with respect to the treaty.'o

4
5
6
7

8
9
10

By the Ontario BoundariesExtension Act, SC 1912, c 40.
In accordance with Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Ministerof CanadianHeritage), [2005] 3
SCR 388 [Mikisew Cree FirstNation].
Grassy Narrows FirstNation, supra note 1 at para 52.
Ibid at para 30. See also the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that was affirmed by the
Supreme Court, Keewatin v Ontario (MinisterofNaturalResources), 2013 ONCA 158, 114 OR (3d)
401 [Keewatin].
(1888), 14 App Cas 46 [St. Catherine'sMilling].
Ibidat 60, as quoted by McLachlin CJC in Grassy Narrows FirstNation, supra note 1 at para 33.
Grassy Narrows FirstNation, supra note 1 at para 32.
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In this article, I will examine how the theory of unity of the Crown
was applied in Canada prior to the Grassy Narrows First Nation decision,
especially where Indigenous peoples were concerned. While examining the
matter historically, I will also attempt to explain the doctrinal underpinnings
of the theory, with emphasis on the common law requirement that rights and
obligations be vested in a juristic entity with legal personality. I will suggest that
the theory makes no sense in Canada's federal context, and should not have
been transported here by Privy Council judges whose constitutional mindset
was English. I will conclude by critiquing the Supreme Court's revival of the
theory to support its decision in Grassy Narrows FirstNation.
1.

Early Application of the Theory in Canada
(a) Attorney General of Ontario v Mercer

"

The first important Canadian case of which I am aware that has some bearing
on this issue of the unity of the Crown is Attorney Generalof Ontariov Mercer.
The case involved a dispute between Canada and Ontario over entitlement to
land, title to which had become vested in the Crown by escheat when the fee
simple titleholder died intestate without heirs. 12 Interpreting several provisions
of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 (then the British North America Act, 1867),13 the
Privy Council decided that the province was entitled to the lands, principally
due to section 109, which provides:
All lands, mines, minerals, and royalties belonging to the several provinces of
Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, at the Union, and all sums then
due or payable for such lands, mines, minerals, or royalties, shall belong to
the several provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick,
in which the same are situate or arise, subject to any trusts existing in respect
4
thereof, and to any interest other than that of the province in the same.'

Although the Lord Chancellor (the Earl of Selborne), delivering the opinion,
suggested that the term "lands" in this section may not include the right to

11
12

13
14

4

(1883), 8 App Cas 767 [Mercer].
The case was commenced by an information laid by the Attorney General of Ontario to recover
possession of the escheated lands from the defendant Mercer and others, but after Ontario
succeeded at trial Canada appealed in the name of the defendant, whereupon the action proceeded
to determine the question ofwhether Ontario or Canada was entitled to lands in the province that
escheated to the Crown.
30 & 31 Vic, c 3.
Ibid, s 109.
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escheat," he nonetheless decided that "royalties," broadly interpreted, does
encompass this right. Accordingly, lands that escheat to the Crown, whether
before or after Confederation, belong to the province in which they are located,
not to Canada.
The Lord Chancellor did not mention the unity of the Crown in
reaching this conclusion. However, when basing his decision on statutory
interpretation, he begged the question of how "lands, mines, minerals, and
royalties" can "belong" to a province. Does this mean that each province has
legal personality, so that it can hold property? In the common law, legal rights
- especially property rights - can only be vested in juristic persons, whether
natural (living human beings) or artificial (corporations).16 In England, the
dual capacity of the King or Queen was acknowledged and explained in the
sixteen century by inventing the concept of his or her two bodies: the natural
body, which can live and die and own property as a natural person, and the
body politic - the Crown - which does not die and which owns property
as a corporation sole. 17 But while this ingenious device may work, however
awkwardly," in England, how does a province, or indeed the Dominion of
Canada, fit into the scheme?
15

16
17

18

This is questionable (see Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of
English Law before the Time of Edward I, 2 n' ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898),
vol lI, 82: "Escheat ... can hardly be described as [a mode] by which property rights are acquired.
The lord's rights have been there all along; the tenant's rights disappear; the lord has all along
been entitled to the land; he is entitled to it now, and, since he has no tenant, he can enjoy it in
demesne."), but for our purposes it is irrelevant.
See Sir Robert Megarry and HWR Wade, The Law ofRealProperty, Sh ed (London: Stevens & Sons
Limited, 1984), 49-52.
See Case of the Duchy of Lancaster (1562) 1 Plow 212 (QB); Willion v Berkley, (1561) 1 Plow 223
(CP). For detailed discussion, see Ernst H Kantorowicz, The King' Two Bodies:A Study in Mediaeval
Political Theology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Paul Lordon, Crown
Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991), 1-5. For a definition of corporation sole, see Megarry and
Wade, supra note 16 at 51: "A corporation sole consists of a single individual holding an office which
has a perpetual succession."
See FW Maitland, "The Crown as Corporation Sole" (1901) 17 Law Q Rev 131-46, reprinted
in HAL Fisher, ed, The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1911), vol III, 244-70, and David Runciman and Magnus Ryan, eds, FW
Maitland: State, Trust and Corporation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 32-48
[Maitland, "Crown as Corporation," cited to Fisher], arguing that the concept of corporation sole
had been invented in an attempt (unsuccessful, in Maitland's learned opinion) to rationalize the
anomalous situation of the parish parson, whose right to the glebe passed to his successor (not to
his heirs), even though a successor would not be named until after his death: see FW Maitland,
"The Corporation Sole" (1900) 16 Law Q Rev 335-54, reprinted in Fisher, ibid, vol III, 210-43,
and Runciman and Ryan, ibid, 9-30. Sir Frederick Pollock, in the 6 h edition of his First Book of
Jurisprudence (London: MacMillan and Co, 1929), at 121, cited these two articles by Maitland
and wryly observed: "In England we now say that the Crown is a corporation, though this is an
innovation made in an age of pedantry, and seems to be of no real use."
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(b) St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen
Lord Watson attempted to answer this question in St. Catherine'Milling.' As is
well known, the case decided that the beneficial interest in the lands in Ontario
that are covered by Treaty 3 belonged to the province, not to the Dominion of
Canada, after the surrender provision in the treaty removed the burden of the
Ojibway's Aboriginal title from the Crown's underlying title. In reaching this
conclusion, the Privy Council relied on section 109 of the Constitution Act,
1867.20 Lord Watson stated:
The Crown has all along had a present proprietary estate in the land, upon which
the Indian title was a mere burden. The ceded territory was at the time of the
union, land vested in the Crown, subject to "an interest other than that of the
Province in the same," within the meaning of sect. 109; and must now belong to
Ontario in terms of that clause .... 21

On what this provision means when it says that the lands "belong to Ontario"
after the Aboriginal title was surrendered by Treaty 3, Lord Watson observed:
In construing these enactments [of the Constitution Act, 1867], it must always
be kept in view that, wherever public land with its incidents is described as "the
property of" or as "belonging to" the Dominion or a Province, these expressions
merely import that the right to its beneficial use, or to its proceeds, has been
appropriated to the Dominion or the Province, as the case may be, and is subject
to the control of its legislature, the land itself being vested in the Crown.

22

This passage is a clear expression of the theory of the unity of the
Crown, as applied in Canada's federal context. Public property is held by a
single juristic entity, the Crown, 23 which we know has legal personality and

22
23

St. Catherine'sMilling, supra note 8.
Supra note 13.
St. Catherine' Milling, supra note 8 at 58-59. Note that Lord Watson's view that the Crown has "a
present proprietary estate" in land that is subject to Aboriginal title and that such land is "vested
in the Crown" has been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada: see Tsilhqot'in Nation v British
Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 3 CNLR 362 [Tsilhqot'in Nation], at paras 70-71, 110-16.
St. Catherine'sMilling, supra note 8 at 56.
The term "Crown" appears as a noun only once in the ConstitutionAct, 1867, supra note 13, in the
Preamble: "Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed
their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom."
Used as an adjective in the phrase "Commissioner of Crown Lands," the term appears in sections
63, 83, 134, and 135, in each instance in reference to the member of the executive occupying that
office before Confederation in the Province of Canada and after Confederation in the provinces

6

Volume 20, Issue 1, 2015

19
20
21

Kent McNeil

perpetual succession as a corporation sole (though Lord Watson did not refer
to it as such). But what of the provinces that were united and formed by the
Constitution Act, 1867, and the Dominion of Canada that was created by the
same statute - do they lack legal personality? If they have legal personality,
why can't they own land in their own right? If they don't have legal personality,
how can they have a beneficial interest in lands owned by the Crown? And yet,
according to Lord Watson, they clearly can have such an interest. He said this:
The enactments of sect. 109 are, in the opinion of their Lordships, sufficient
to give to each Province, subject to the administration and control of its own
Legislature, the entire beneficial interest of the Crown in all lands within its
boundaries, which at the time of the union were vested in the Crown, with the
exception of such lands as the Dominion acquired right to under sect. 108, or
might assume for the purposes specified in sect. 117.24

Apparently, the legal position regarding public lands was the same after
Confederation as before. Referring to the Act of Union2 5 that united Upper and
Lower Canada in 1840, Lord Watson said:
By an Imperial statute passed in the year 1840 .. ., the provinces of Ontario and
Quebec, then known as Upper and Lower Canada, were united under the name
of the Province of Canada, and it was, inter alia, enacted that, in consideration
of certain annual payments which Her Majesty had agreed to accept by way
of civil list, the produce of all territorial and other revenues at the disposal of
the Crown arising in either of the united Provinces should be paid into the
consolidated fund of the new Province. There was no transfer to the Province
of any legal estate in the Crown lands, which continued to be vested in the
Sovereign; but all moneys realized by sales or in any other manner became the
property of the Province. In other words, all beneficial interest in such lands
within the provincial boundaries belonging to the Queen, and either producing
or capable of producing revenue, passed to the Province, the title still remaining
in the Crown. That continued to be the right of the Province until the passing of
the British North America Act, 1867.26

24

of Ontario and Quebec. This usage assumes that public lands in the provinces were Crown lands,
before and after Confederation. If "Crown" means the same thing in these sections as in the
Preamble, it evidently refers to "the Queen," the term commonly used throughout the Act to refer
to Her Majesty in her official capacity.
St. Catherine'sMilling, supra note 8 at 57-58. See also ibid at 59. Section 108 of the ConstitutionAct,
1867 (supra note 13) provides that "[t]he Public Works and Property of each Province, enumerated
in the Third Schedule to this Act, shall be the Property of Canada." Section 117 gives Canada the
right "to assume any Lands or Public Property required for Fortifications or for the Defence of the
Country."

25

3 & 4 Vic, c 35.

26

St. Catherine'sMilling, supra note 8 at 55. Cf Lord Watson's observations on the ConstitutionAct,
1867, in Liquidatorsof the Maritime Bank of Canadav Receiver-GeneralNew Brunswick, [1892] AC
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In this passage, Lord Watson appears to have
Queen," "the Sovereign," and "the Crown"
to the Queen in her official capacity as the
as well of the United Kingdom and as the
situated within her dominions. 2 7

used the terms "Her Majesty" "the
interchangeably they all refer
sovereign of her overseas colonies
owner of Crown lands, wherever

Frederic William Maitland, with his usual directness and wit, took
Lord Watson to task for being a "lawyer with theories in his head" and "placing
a legal estate in what he calls the Crown or Her Majesty." 28 The British North
America Act, 1867, Maitland wrote, contains courageous words," such as:
"Canada shall be liable for the Debts and Liabilities of each Province existing at
the Union" (section 111); "[t]he several Provinces shall retain all their respective
Public Property not otherwise disposed of in this Act" (section 117); "[n]o
Lands or Property belonging to Canada or any Province shall be liable to
Taxation" (section 125), etc. 2 9 But, as a result of Lord Watson's decision in St.
CatherinesMilling, Maitland observed that
... we have to distinguish the lands vested in the Crown "for" or "in right of"
Canada from lands vested in the Crown "for" or "in right of" Quebec or Ontario
or British Columbia, or between lands "vested in the Crown as represented by
the Dominion" and lands "vested in the Crown as represented by a Province."
Apparently "Canada" or "Nova Scotia' is person enough to be the Crown's cestui
que trust and at the same time the Crown's representative, but is not person
enough to hold a legal estate. It is a funny jumble, which becomes funnier still if
we insist that the Crown is a legal fiction. 0

To this we might add that, not only can provinces have a beneficial interest in
Crown lands, but according to Lord Watson they also have "the property" in
moneys obtained from the sale of these lands. Apparently, the provinces have
legal personality for some purposes, but not for others.

28

437, at 441-42 [Maritime Bank of Canada],quoted in note 58 infra.
The distinction between land owned by the Queen in her official capacity as corporation sole and
land owned by her in her personal capacity as a natural person is vital. When she dies, the latter
goes to her heir whereas the former goes to her successor. See Mercer, supra note 11 at 778-79.
Maitland, "Crown as Corporation," supra note 18 at 264.

29

Ibid at 263.

30

Ibid at 264-65. See also Bora Laskin, The British Tradition in Canadian Law (London: Stevens
& Sons, 1969), at 118, commenting on the "sophistry" reflected in Lord Watson's judgment by
"emphasis on Her Majesty personally as being vested with title to property, whether it was that
of Canada or of a Province, but acknowledging that different administrating persons or bodies
would wield effective control." Laskin observed: "This simply confused the Crown as executive
and the Crown as personification of the state, but contributed nothing to its evident differentiation
as federal and provincial executive. It was a lingering grasp of unreality which no longer has any
international legal significance since Canada can contract with foreign states independently" (ibid).

27

8
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2.

Modern Case Law
(a)

The Queen v The Secretary ofState for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, exparte Indian Association ofAlberta

The issue of the divisibility of the Crown was revisited by the English Court
of Appeal in The Queen v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, exparte IndianAssociation ofAlberta.31 That case involved a challenge by
the Indian Association of Alberta, the Union of New Brunswick Indians, and
the Union of Nova Scotian Indians to patriation of Canada's Constitution in
1982. Briefly, those First Nation organizations objected to patriation because
they thought it would violate the direct relationship the Indian nations have
with the Queen of the United Kingdom and interfere with her obligations to
them, established by solemn declarations and agreements such as the Royal
Proclamationof 176332 and the historical treaties. The Court of Appeal, while
sympathetic to their position, decided that responsibility for Indian affairs
had been entirely transferred from the government of the United Kingdom
to the Canadian government by devolution of constitutional authority. Any
obligations of the Crown to the First Nations were therefore owed by the
Crown in right of Canada, not the Crown in right of the United Kingdom.
Accordingly, there was no basis in law for the plaintiffs to object to patriation.
In reaching this decision, the judges re-examined the old theory of the
unity of the Crown and concluded that its application had been modified in the
context of the British Commonwealth. Lord May said this:
Although at one time it was correct to describe the Crown as one and
indivisible, with the development of the Commonwealth this is no longer
so. Although there is only one person who is the Sovereign within the British
Commonwealth, it is now a truism that in matters of law and government
the Queen of the United Kingdom, for example, is entirely independent and
distinct from the Queen of Canada. Further, the Crown is a constitutional
monarchy and thus when one speaks today, and as was frequently done in
the course of the argument on this application, of the Crown "in right of
Canada," or of some other territory within the Commonwealth, this is only a
short way of referring to the Crown acting through and on the advice of Her
Ministers in Canada or in that other territory within the Commonwealth."

31

[1982] QB 892, [1981] 4 CNLR 86 [Indian Association ofAlberta, cited to QB]. See also Manuelet
al vAttorney-General ofEngland, [1982] 3 CNLR 13 (Ch), aff'd [1982] 3 WLR 821 (Eng CA).

32

6 October 1763, in RSC 1985, App II, No 1.

33

IndianAssociation ofAlberta, supra note 31 at 928.
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Lord Denning observed that "in the

18

" and

19

" centuries it was a settled

doctrine of constitutional law that the Crown was one and indivisible. The
colonies formed one realm with the United Kingdom, the whole being under
the sovereignty of the Crown. The Crown had full powers to establish such
executive, legislative and judicial arrangements as it thought fit."3 4 The St.
Catherine Milling case, he noted, had been decided at a time when the theory
of the unity of the Crown still applied. But the constitutional position has
changed since then. Lord Denning stated:
Hitherto I have said that in constitutional law the Crown was single and
indivisible. But that law was changed in the first half of this century - not
by statute - but by constitutional usage and practice. The Crown became
separate and divisible - according to the particular territory in which it
was sovereign. This was recognised by the Imperial Conference of 1926
. . . . Thenceforward the Crown was no longer single and indivisible. It
was separate and divisible for each self-governing dominion or province or
territory."

The case before the Court of Appeal involved separation of the Crown
in right of Canada from the Crown in right of the United Kingdom.3 6 In that
context, Lord Denning was perhaps justified in situating the change in the
period leading up to and including the Imperial Conference of 1926, during
which time the Dominions began to exercise independence from the United
Kingdom in foreign affairs.3 7 In so situating the change, His Lordship was
also able to avoid disagreeing with Lord Watson's views on the matter in St.
Catherine Milling.38 However, in the domestic context of Canadian federalism,
there was no corresponding shift in the constitutional position between the
time St. Catherine Milling was decided in 1888 and the Imperial Conference
of 1926. Apart from the creation of the new provinces of Saskatchewan and
Alberta in 1905 and the retention by Canada of public lands and resources

34
35

Ibid at 911.
Ibid at 916-17. For authority, Lord Denning cited R v Secretary ofState for Home Department, Ex
parte Bhurosah, [1968] 1 QB 266, where the English CA held that Queen is Queen of Mauritius and
so the Crown in right of Mauritius can issue passports, and Mellenger vNew Brunswick Corporation
(CA.), [1971] 1 WLR 604, where the same court held that the Queen is Queen of New Brunswick
and so the Province has state immunity.

36

See Peter W Hogg, Patrick J Monahan, and Wade K Wright, Liability of the Crown, 4th ed
(Toronto: Carswell, 2011), at 14, describing the result in IndianAssociation ofAlberta, supra note
31: "The Crown was thus divisible: the Crown in right of Canada was a separate legal entity from
the Crown in right of the United Kingdom."

37

See David E Smith, The Invisible Crown: The First Principle of Canadian Government, 2nd ed
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), at 28-30.

38

IO0

See text accompanying notes 21-27 supra.
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in the Prairie Provinces until 1930,39 the allocation of public property and
division-of-powers as set out in the ConstitutionAct, 1867, remained the same.
The Crown in right of Canada and the Crown in right of the four original
provinces were conceptually separated in 1867, as made clear by the various
provisions of that Act that distributed public property, debts and liabilities
between Canada on the one hand and the various provinces on the other.40 As
Maitland suggested, it would make sense to accord legal personality to each of
these domestic manifestations of the Crown from the time of Confederation
forward, even if the Crown in right of Canada did not have legal personality
internationally until it gained control of Canadas foreign affairs.
Unlike Lord Denning, Lord Kerr did not regard the degree of
independence of a colony or dominion as having anything to do with the
location of the Crown's rights and obligations:
The situs of such rights and obligations rests with the overseas governments
within the realm of the Crown, and not with the Crown in right or respect
of the United Kingdom, even though the powers of such governments fall
a very long way below the level of independence. Indeed, independence, or
the degree of independence, is wholly irrelevant to the issue, because it is
clear that rights and obligations of the Crown will arise exclusively in right
or respect of any government outside the bounds of the United Kingdom as
soon as it can be seen that there is an established government of the Crown
in the overseas territory in question. In relation to Canada this had clearly
happened by 1867.42

Referring to the ConstitutionAct, 1867, his Lordship said this:

-

The effect of the 1867 Act and its successors, up to the Statute ofWestminster,
1931, was accordingly to create an all-embracing federal governmental
structure for Canada, which - subject to one point discussed hereafter

39

40
41

42

This anomaly meant that s 109 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, quoted in text accompanying note 14
supra, did not apply to the Prairie Provinces. This discriminatory treatment was corrected by the
Natural Resources Transfer Agreements, given constitutional force by the Constitution Act, 1930,
20 & 21 Geo V, c 26 (UK).
See text accompanying note 29 supra. See also Laskin, supra note 30 at 118-19.
It is entirely possible for an entity to have legal personality in domestic law but not in international
or British Imperial law. For example, Aboriginal nations in Canada apparently did not have legal
personality internationally prior to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, which may have changed this, but since Crown assertion of sovereignty they have had
legal personality in Canadian law for the purpose of holding Aboriginal title, a proprietary right:
see Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010; Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 21. See
discussion in "The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title," in Kent McNeil,
Emerging Justice: Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001), 102 at 124-27.
IndianAssociation ofAlberta, supra note 31 at 927.
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was wholly independent and autonomous in relation to all internal affairs.43

In relation to the division of powers and of public property, he continued:
Since the passing of this Act [the Constitution Act, 1867] there have been
numerous cases, many of which reached the Privy Council, concerning
the respective rights and obligations as between the Dominion and the
provinces. In the present context the most important ones arose out of
the dichotomy between sections 91(24) and 109: whereas the Dominion
Government was vested with exclusive legislative power concerning the
Indian peoples and the lands reserved for them, the lands themselves, and
44

the usufructuary rights arising out of them, were vested in the provinces.

While not disagreeing expressly with the way Lord Watson had described
the meaning of "belong to the several Provinces" in section 109,15 Lord Kerr

nonetheless showed no hesitation in speaking of powers being "vested" in the
Dominion government and public property being "vested" in the provinces.
I have no doubt that Maitland would have approved of this apparent
acknowledgement of the constitutional reality in federal Dominions and of the
implied attribution of legal personality to the Crown in right of Canada and to
the Crown in right of each of the provinces as separate juristic entities.
Lord Kerr pointed out that the decision in St. Catherine' Milling,
holding that legislative authority over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the
Indians" was vested in the Parliament of Canada while underlying title to
those lands was vested in the provinces, resulted in further litigation. The
most important cases involved responsibility for fulfillment of the Crown's
obligations under the Indian treaties, especially Treaty 3.17 In Attorney-General
for Canada v Attorney-Generalfor Ontario," the Privy Council decided that
Ontario, although benefiting from the surrender of Aboriginal title by the
1850 Robinson Treaties, had no legal obligation after Confederation to pay
43

bid at 924-25. The exception referred to is the reservation and disallowance power in ss 55-56,
by which the UK government retained ultimate authority over enactments of the Parliament of
Canada.

44

Ibid at 925

45

See discussion of St. Catherine'sMilling, supra note 8, in text accompanying notes 21-22 supra. Lord
Kerr referred to the Privy Council's judgment in that case as authority that s 109, "and the cession
under the treaty, vested the whole of the beneficial interest in the land (including its timber, etc.)
in the province to the exclusion of the Dominion, notwithstanding the legislative power of the
Dominion under section 91(24)": Indian Association ofAlberta, supra note 31 at 925.
See also Laskin, supra note 30 at 119.
For critical discussion of the leading cases, see Leonard Ian Rotman, ParallelPaths: Fiduciary
Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1996), 221-39.

46
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the annuities owing to the Indian parties. The Privy Council came to the same
conclusion with regard to the annuities payable under Treaty 3 in Dominion
of Canada v Province of Ontario." In Ontario Mining Company and AttorneyGeneralfor Canada v Seybold et al. andAttorney-Generalfor Ontario,"o the Privy
Council left open the question of whether the Province had any obligation to
provide lands for the reserves that had been promised to the Saulteaux Tribe by
the terms of Treaty 3.1

This litigation between the Dominion of Canada and the Province of
Ontario over responsibility for promises made in the treaties reveals even more
clearly that the Crown in right of Canada and the Crown in right Ontario
are separate juristic entities with distinct legal personalities, for otherwise how
could they sue one another?5 2 The issue usually got finessed by the technique
of bringing the action in the name of and against attorneys general rather than
the Queen or King, but that could not hide the reality of what was taking place:
the legal actions were really between two governments acting on behalf of two
Crowns, one in right of Canada and the other in right of Ontario. 53 Using
attorneys general as plaintiff and defendant was little more than a semantic
slight-of-hand in the style of cause to avoid the appearance of the Crown suing
itself and to side-step the issue of the legal personality of Canada and Ontario.54
(b) Mitchell v Peguis Indian Band
In Mitchell v Peguis Indian Band,5 5 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the

49
50
51

[1910] AC 637.
[1903] AC 73.
The case decided that Canada was unable on its own to fulfill its treaty obligation to create reserves,
as the beneficial interest in the lands surrendered by Treaty 3 had vested in the Crown in right of
Ontario, as held by the Privy Council in the St. Catherine's Milling case: see text accompanying
notes 19-21 supra. 'The matter was resolved by federal-provincial agreements, culminating in 1924:
see Peter A Cumming and Neil H Mickenberg, eds, Native Rights in Canada, 2 n' ed (Toronto:

Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada and General Publishing Co, 1972), 230-31. 'The 1924
agreement was implemented by reciprocal legislation: SC 1924, c 48; SO 1924, c 15.
52

Of course this issue arises in virtually every division-of-powers case involving Canada and a
province, not just cases involving Aboriginal peoples and their land rights: see the many cases
discussed in the federalism chapters in Peter W Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada (Toronto:
Carswell, Looseleaf Edition) [Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw].

53
54

Ibid at 10-3, n 5. See also Hogg, Monahan, and Wright, supra note 36 at 14, n 71.
An equivalent issue arises where Canada and a province contract with one another, as happens
frequently. See Laskin, supra note 30 at 122: "it is mere word-playing or play-acting to say that
because a person cannot at common law contract with himself, there cannot in law be a contract to
which Her Majesty is a party on each side." But to be a party on each side of a contract, the Crown
must have more than one legal personality.

55

[1990] 2 SCR 85 [Mitchell].
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meaning of "Her Majesty" in the context of a section of the Indian Act.56 The
provision in question, s. 90(1), deems "personal property that was (a) purchased
by Her Majesty with Indian moneys or moneys appropriated by Parliament for
the use and benefit of Indians or bands, or (b) given to Indians or to a band
under a treaty or agreement between a band and Her Majesty,

. .

. always to

be situated on a reserve." This deeming provision relates to section 87, which
exempts the property of an Indian or band situated on a reserve from taxation,
and section 89 (the section involved in the case), which provides that such
property "is not subject to charge, pledge, mortgage, attachment, levy, seizure,
distress or execution in favour or at the instance of any person other than an
Indian." The litigation involved money owed by the Province of Manitoba to
the Peguis Indian Band and other First Nations under an agreement by the
Province to refund taxes improperly collected on electricity supplied to their
reserves. Before the money was paid to the First Nations, the appellants obtained
a pre-judgment garnishing order against it for a sum allegedly owing to them
for negotiating the tax refund agreement. The First Nations denied liability,
inter alia on the ground that the agreement had not been obtained through the
appellants' efforts, but the issue of their liability to pay had not yet gone to trial.
The case before the Supreme Court involved the legality of the
garnishing order, which depended in part on whether the term "Her Majesty"
in section 90(1) is limited to the Crown in right of Canada, or encompasses
the Crown in right of Manitoba and the other provinces as well. Of the seven
Supreme Court justices hearing the appeal, only Dickson CJC was of the
opinion that the term included the provincial Crowns so that the money the
Province owed to the First Nations was deemed to be located on their reserves
and could not be garnished for that reason. Although the other six judges
disagreed with this interpretation, they decided in favour of the First Nations
nonetheless, mainly on the basis of Crown immunity and construction of the
provincial GarnishmentAct.17
For our purposes, the relevance of the Mitchell decision lies in the
approaches taken by Dickson CJC alone and La Forest J for the rest of the
Court to interpretation of "Her Majesty" in section 90(1). Both judges seem to
have rejected the suggestion that, as a matter of constitutional law, the Crown
is indivisible within Canada. Dickson CJC wrote:
The Court of Appeal relied on the idea that the Crown was indivisible to hold
that "Her Majesty" had to apply to both levels of government. With respect,
56
57
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RSC 1970, c 1-6, currently RSC 1985, c I-5.
RSM 1970, c G20.
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I cannot adopt that approach. The Court of Appeal's interpretation seems
grounded in the belief that there cannot be "two Queens." As Professor Hogg
succinctly notes in ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2nd ed., at p. 2 1 6 , divisibility
of the Crown in Canada does not mean that there are eleven Queens or eleven
Sovereigns but, rather, it expresses the notion (at p. 217) of " . . . a single
Queen recognized by many separate jurisdictions." Divisibility of the Crown
recognizes the fact of a division of legislative power and a parallel division of
executive power."

However, the ChiefJustice did not think the question of whether "Her Majesty"
in section 90(1) includes the provincial Crowns hinges on the issue of the
divisibility of the Crown. Instead, this is a question of statutory interpretation
that he said could be resolved by applying the principle from Nowegijick v The
Queen that "doubtful expressions" in treaties and statutes affecting Indians
should be interpreted in their favour. 9 In the context of section 90(1), he said
this principle is supported by taking the Aboriginal perspective into account:
[T]he Indians' relationship with the Crown or sovereign has never depended
on the particular representatives of the Crown involved. From the aboriginal
perspective, any federal-provincial divisions that the Crown has imposed on
itself are internal to itself and do not alter the basic structure of SovereignIndian relations. This is not to suggest that aboriginal peoples are outside
the sovereignty of the Crown, nor does it call into question the divisions of
jurisdiction in relation to aboriginal peoples in federal Canada.

60

La Forest J did not share Dickson CJC's perception of the Aboriginal
perspective, at least in modern times. He stated:

58

Mitchell, supra note 55 at para 23. Dickson CJC went on to say that, if "a principle so basic"
needed to be supported by judicial authority, it could be found in the Privy Council decision
in Maritime Bank of Canada, supra note 26, where Lord Watson stated at 441-42: "The object
of the Act [the British North America Act, 1867] was neither to weld the provinces into one, nor
to subordinate provincial governments to a central authority, but to create a federal government
in which they should all be represented, entrusted with the exclusive administration of affairs in
which they had a common interest, each province retaining its independence and autonomy. That
object was accomplished by distributing, between the Dominion and the provinces, all powers
executive and legislative, and all public property and revenues which had previously belonged to the
provinces." The Chief Justice did not refer to Lord Watson's opinion in the St. Catherine'sMilling
case, delivered just four years earlier, where his Lordship expressed the view that there is just one
Crown in Canada: see text accompanying note 22 supra. Instead, Dickson CJC found support
for the divisibility of the Crown in the judgments in IndianAssociation ofAlberta, supra note 31,
discussed in text accompanying notes 31-54 supra. See also Smith v The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR
554 at 571 [Smith], where Estey J, for a unanimous Court, spoke of "two Crowns" (in the French
version, expressed as "la Couronne du chef du Canada et du chef de la province"), while applying
St. Catherine Milling in the context of a surrender of reserve lands in New Brunswick.

59

[1983] 1 SCR 29 at 36.

60

Mitchell, supra note 55 at para 35.
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In arriving at his conclusion that the trial judge was correct in interpreting
"Her Majesty" in s. 90(1)(b) as including the provincial Crowns, the
Chief Justice sets considerable store on what he takes to be the aboriginal
perception of "Her Majesty." With deference, I question his conclusion that
it is realistic, in this day and age, to proceed on the assumption that from
the aboriginal perspective, any federal-provincial divisions that the Crown
has imposed on itself are simply internal to itself, such that the Crown may
'

be considered what one might style an "indivisible entity." 6

So, while Dickson CJC and La Forest J disagreed over the Aboriginal perception
of the Crown, they both appear to have come to the conclusion that the Crown
is divisible in Canadian constitutional law.
(C)

Osoyoos Indian Band v The Town of Oliver

Osoyoos Indian Band v The Town of Oliver 2 involved an Indian band's authority
under the Indian Act to tax reserve lands. In 1925, the Province of British
Columbia constructed a concrete-lined irrigation canal across the reserve of
the Osoyoos Band in the Okanagan Valley. Apparently, this was done without
proper legal authority, a problem that Canada addressed in 1957 by issuing
an Order in Council that transferred an interest in the reserve land on which
the canal was located to the Province. In so doing, Canada relied on section
35 of the Indian Act, which authorizes the Governor in Council to consent
to the expropriation of reserve lands pursuant to provincial legislation and to
"authorize a transfer or grant of such lands to the province."6 3 Specifically, the
Order in Council provided that
the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration, pursuant to the provisions of Section 35 of
the Indian Act, is pleased hereby to consent to the taking of the said lands [as
described in the Order] by the Province of British Columbia and to transfer
the administration and control thereof to Her Majesty the Queen in right of
4

the Province of British Columbia.1

62

Ibid at para 122. La Forest J continued: "But even accepting that assumption, it does not follow
that fairness requires one to proceed on the basis that Indians would be justified in concluding
that all property they may acquire pursuant to agreements with that 'indivisible entity' should
be automatically protected, regardless of situs, by the exemptions and privileges conferred by ss.
87 and 89 of the Indian Act. I have no doubt that Indians are very much aware that ordinary
commercial dealings constitute 'affairs of life' that do not fall to be governed by their treaties or the
IndianAct. Thus I take it that Indians, when engaging in the cut and thrust of business dealings in
the commercial mainstream are under no illusions that they can expect to compete from a position
of privilege with respect to their fellow Canadians."
[2001] 3 SCR 746 [Osoyoos Indian Band].
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RSC 1952, c 149, s 35, currently RSC 1985, c 1-5, s 35.
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Order in Council 1957-577, dated 25 April 1957, as quoted in Osoyoos Indian Band, supra note 62
at para 6.
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The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the effect of the Order was
to remove the lands in question from the reserve so that they would not be
subject to the property assessment and property taxation by-laws enacted by the
Osoyoos Indian Band Council in 1994 pursuant to section 83 of the IndianAct.
This depended in turn on whether the Order had transferred the fee simple title
to the Province, thereby removing the lands from the reserve, or merely granted
the Province an easement for irrigation canal purposes, in which case the lands
remained part of the reserve.
A majority of the Court, in a judgment delivered by Justice Jacobucci,
held that only an easement had been granted, with the result that the lands
were still part of the reserve and subject to the property tax by-laws of the Band.
Regarding the nature of the interest transferred, Jacobucci J wrote:
I conclude that the Order in Council is ambiguous. There are no clear words
of exclusion or limitation that make plain the extent of the interest being
transferred. Some phrases in the recitals suggest that a transfer of a fee simple
is contemplated . . ., while others suggest a more restricted interest .... Given
that the law views property as a bundle of rights, that the Order in Council
grants "a portion" of the reserve is not inconsistent with the granting of an
easement or a right to use the land "for irrigation canal purposes." A right to
use the land for a restricted purpose is part of the bundle of rights that make
up the property interest in the reserve and so may be referred to as "a portion"
of the reserve."

Jacobucci J thus held that a property interest, albeit less than fee simple, had
been transferred from Canada to the Province of British Columbia by the
Order. He did not discuss and did not seem to have been concerned about
the theoretical indivisibility of the Crown or the question of how the Crown
in right of Canada could convey property to the Crown in right of British
Columbia. On the contrary, he took it for granted that such a transaction could
take place.66

65
66

Osoyoos Indian Band, supra note 62 at para 81.
Regarding the words "transfer the administration and control" in the Order, Jacobucci J said
they "are not determinative of the nature of the interest acquired by the Province in this case.
Administrative powers can be ancillary to an easement for irrigation purposes": ibid at para 88. He
therefore regarded administrative powers over land as distinct from proprietary interests, both of
which can be transferred from the Crown in right of Canada to the Crown in right of a province.
Compare Canada (Attorney General) v Higbie and Albion Investments Ltd, [1945] SCR 385, per
Rinfret CJ and Taschereau J, affirming the theory of Crown unity by relying on St. Catherine's
Milling, supra note 8, and other cases, in particular Saskatchewan NaturalResources Reference, [1931]
SCR 263, where Newcombe J stated at 275: "It is not by grant inter partes that Crown lands are
passed from one branch to another to the King's government; the transfer takes effect, in the
absence of special provision, sometimes by order in council, sometimes by despatch. There is only

Review of Constitutional Studies/Revue d'dtudes constitutionnelles

17

The Obsolete Theory of Crown Unity in Canada and Its Relevance to Indigenous Claims

Justice Gonthier delivered the opinion of the four dissenting members
of the Court in the 0 soyoos Indian Band case. Unlike the majority, he thought
that the Order transferred the fee simple, which he equated with full ownership,
to the Province, removing the lands in question from the reserve and thus
from the taxation authority of the Osoyoos Band Council. He concluded that,
"through the adoption of the Order in Council by the federal government, Her
Majesty the Queen in right of the Province of British Columbia obtained full
ownership over the lands on which the irrigation canal is situated." 7
All the judges in 0 soyoos Indian Band were thus in agreement that
property interests can be transferred by Order in Council from the Crown in
right of Canada to the Crown in right of British Columbia. This must mean
that these Crowns are separate juristic entities, each with legal personality and
the capacity to obtain, hold, and transfer property rights.
(d) Blueberry River Indian Band v Canada (Department of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development)
In Blueberry River Indian Band v Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development)," the Supreme Court went even further than it had in
OsoyoosIndianBandin dividing the Crown in the context of dealings with Indian
reserve lands. In the 19 4 0s, the Beaver Indian Band had surrendered its reserve
lands near Fort St. John in British Columbia to the Crown, in accordance with
the surrender provisions of the Indian Act.69 In 1948, the federal Department
of Indian Affairs (DIA) sold these lands to the Director, the Veterans'LandAct
(DVLA). 70 Contrary to its own policy and to the interests of the Band to which
the Crown owed fiduciary obligations in the context of the surrender'7 1 the
DIA did not retain the mineral rights when it transferred title to these lands to

67
68

69
70
71

one Crown, and the lands belonging to the Crown are and remain vested in it, notwithstanding
that the administration of them and the exercise of their beneficial use may, from time to time,
as competently authorized, be regulated upon the advice of different Ministers charged with the
appropriate service." Here, Newcombe J was expressing the old view of unity of the Crown and
administrative control that was accepted by Rinfret CJ and Taschereau J in Higbie in 1945, but that
has since been discarded in the more recent decisions examined in this article, until GrassyNarrows
FirstNation, supra note 1.
Osoyoos Indian Band, supra note 62 at para 188.
[1995] 4 SCR 344 (BlueberryRiver Indian Band). I have chosen to discuss this case after Osoyoos
Indian Band rather than chronologically because Osoyoos, like Mitchell, involved division between
the Crown in right of Canada and the Crown in right of a province, whereas Blueberry River
involved a division within the federal government itself.
RSC 1927, c 98, ss 50-54, currently RSC 1985, c 1-5, ss 37-41.
SC 1942, c 33.
See Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335 [Guerin].
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the DVLA. After the DVLA in turn transferred its title to veterans, oil and gas
were discovered on the lands. The Beaver Indian Band and its successors (the
plaintiffs in this case) received no benefit from this discovery.
In this action for breach of the Crown's fiduciary obligations,
the Supreme Court held that the DIA breached these obligations when it
transferred the surrendered lands to the DVLA without reserving the mineral
rights. However, recovery for this breach was barred by the applicable statutory
limitation period. The Court nonetheless held that the DIA breached the
Crown's fiduciary obligations again when it failed to recover the mineral rights
from the DVLA prior to the conveyances to the veterans, as the DIA could
and should have done after becoming aware that the mineral rights might
be of value, by invoking section 64 of the Indian Act, which empowered the
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to cancel any sale of Indian land and
resume the land if the sale was made "in error or mistake." 72
The relevance of this decision to the unity of the Crown arises from an
argument made by the plaintiffs in relation to the nature of the 1948 transfer of
the lands from the DIA to the DVLA. McLachlin J, as she then was, summarized
the argument as follows:
[T]he Bands argue that the 1948 transfer to the DVLA was not a transfer at
all, but merely an administrative allocation within the bosom of the unified
Crown. Thus, the Crown's fiduciary duty continued, although it was transferred
for administrative purposes to the DVLA after 1948. Consequently, the cause
of action did not arise until the land was alienated from the DVLA to the
veterans."

Justice McLachlin's response is noteworthy:
I cannot accept this argument. Although the transfer was from one Crown
entity to another, it remained a transfer and an alienation of title. First, the
transfer converted the Band's interest from a property interest into a sum of
money, suggesting alienation. Second, the continuing fiduciary duty proposed
for the DVLA is problematic from a practical point of view. Any duty would
have applied, at least in theory, both to the mineral rights and the surface
rights. Each sale to a veteran would have required the DVLA to consider not
only those matters he was entitled to consider under his Act, but sometimes
conflicting matters under the Indian Act. This would have made the sale in
1948 pointless from the DVLA's point of view and have rendered it impossible

72

73

IndianAct, supra note 69, s 64 (RSC 1927). Gonthier and McLachlin JJ, who delivered judgments
concurring in result, were in agreement on this issue: Blueberry River IndianBand, supra note 68 at
paras 20-23 (Gonthier J), 112-18 (McLachlin J).
Blueberry River Indian Band, supra note 68 at para 110.
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to administer. Moreover, it is not clear that the DVLA had any knowledge of
the fiduciary obligations which bound the DIA. In fact, the DVLA and the
DIA acted at arms length throughout, as was appropriate given the different
interests they represented and the different mandates of their statutes. In
summary, the crystallization of the property interest into a monetary sum and
the practical considerations negating a duty in the DVLA toward the Band
negate the suggestion that the 1948 transfer changed nothing and that the real
alienation came later.

4

So even though the DIA and the DVLA were both entities of the
federal government, McLachlin J treated them as separate and capable of
owning and conveying property, both real (the reserve lands) and personal (the
money from the sale of the lands). She might have relied on section 5(1) of the
Veterans'LandAct, which makes the DVLA "a corporation sole" with perpetual
succession for "the purposes of acquiring, holding, conveying and transferring.
. . property" as authorized by the Act, but she did not do so explicitly, perhaps
because the section goes on to provide that, in so doing, the DVLA acts as "the
agent of His Majesty in the right of Canada."17

3.

Grassy Narrows FirstNation v Ontario: An Aberration?

The modern case law thus reveals a growing tendency to accept the reality
that the Crown is divisible in the Commonwealth and within the Canadian
federation. 76 The Crown in right of Canada and the Crown in right of each of the
provinces are clearly separate juristic entities, each endowed with distinct legal
personality.77 This tendency to view the Crown as divisible has generally worked
against the interests of Aboriginal parties. In Indian Association ofAlberta, where
the Aboriginal claimants relied on the unity of the Crown, the English Court
of Appeal held that the Crown in right of Canada is a legal entity separate from
the Crown in right of the United Kingdom. In Mitchell, unity of the Crown
would have strengthened the First Nations' argument regarding the meaning
74

Ibidat para 111.

75

Veterans'LandAct, supra note 70, s 5(1). Prior to the surrender, legal title to these reserve lands
was "in the Crown" (see the definition of "reserve" in the IndianAct, RSC 1927, c 98, s 2(j)), and
so the DIA must have been acting on behalf of the Crown in right of Canada when it conveyed
legal title to these lands to the DVLA. But how, one might ask, could the DVLA have received title
from the Crown in right of Canada as agent of the same Crown? The answer may be found in s 7,
which provides that the DVLA may, for the purposes of the Act, "acquire by consent or agreement
from His Majesty in the right of Canada or from any province or municipal authority, or from
any person, firm or corporation, such lands and buildings situate in any part of Canada ... as the
Director may deem necessary." The statute therefore not only provides express authority for the
DVLA to acquire lands from the Crown in right of Canada, apparently as agent of the same Crown,
but also treats the provinces as separate legal entities from whom the Director can acquire property.
See Halsburys Laws ofEngland, 4,h ed 2003 Reissue (London: LexisNexis UK, 2003), vol 6, at 424
n 1.
Accord Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 52 at 10-3.
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of "Her Majesty" in section 90 of the Indian Act, but the majority held that
even First Nations would not perceive the Crown as an "indivisible entity.""
While the divisibility of the Crown did not affect the outcome in Osoyoos Indian
Band, it certainly would have been detrimental to the plaintiffs in Blueberry
River Indian Band had it not been for section 64 of the Indian Act, and it could
have a negative impact on First Nations generally by restricting the scope of the
Crown's fiduciary obligations within federal government departments.7 9
Yet in the Grassy Narrows First Nation case, where divisibility of the
Crown clearly would have favoured the First Nation plaintiffs, the judges in
both the Ontario Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada reverted to
and relied upon the old theory of the unity of the Crown.so This reliance is
evident in the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal that was affirmed
by the Supreme Court. After reviewing the relevant Treaty 3 case law, especially
St. Catherine' Milling where Lord Watson had emphasized the unity of the
Crown, the Court of Appeal stated:
The Ojibway's Treaty partner is the Crown, not Canada. Canada is not a party
to the Treaty. The Treaty promises are made by the Crown, not by a particular
level of government. The Ojibway may look to the Crown to keep the Treaty
promises, but they must do so within the framework of the division of powers
under the Constitution.'

The Court of Appeal then took the constitutional evolution of Canada
into account:
The taking up clause [in Treaty 382] also has to be interpreted in the light of
the process of constitutional evolution from the time of the Royal Proclamation
in 1763, to the creation of the Province of Canada in 1840, the creation of
the Dominion of Canada and the Province of Ontario at Confederation in
1867, and finally, the extension of Ontario's border in 1912. Throughout that
process of constitutional evolution, the Crown and the relationship between
the Crown and Canada's Aboriginal peoples remains a constant, central
and defining feature. What has evolved is the allocation of legislative and
administrative powers and responsibilities to different levels of government.
In formal terms, what changes with constitutional evolution is the level of

78
79
80

81
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Mitchell, supra note 55 at para 122.
See text accompanying note 74 supra.
Patrick Macklem, in his article "First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian
Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill LJ 382, found a parallel tendency on the part of the courts
to embrace Indigenous difference when it supports the dominant legal paradigm of the Canadian
state and to deny Indigenous difference when it does not.
Keewatin, supra note 7 at para 135.
See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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government on whose advice the Crown acts."

The Court viewed this process of constitutional evolution as continuing up
to the present and as informing the interpretation of treaties: "Treaties must
be capable of adapting to the natural evolution of the Constitution, which
evolves as a 'living tree' to meet 'the changing political and cultural realities
of Canadian society'". For the Court, this meant that the power to take up
lands in the Treaty 3 area that Canada had added to Ontario by the extension
of the provincial boundaries in 1912 passed from the Canadian to the Ontario
government by constitutional evolution, even though the Treaty stated that
taking up was to be "by her said Government of the Dominion of Canada, or by
any of the subjects thereof duly authorized therefor by the said Government."

-

What is remarkable here is the Court ofAppeal's view that constitutional
evolution has affected the way treaties are understood and has extended
provincial authority in relation to treaty lands, but has not changed "the Crown
and the relationship between the Crown and Canadas Aboriginal peoples"
that "remains a constant, central and defining feature."" Yet when the plaintiffs
in Indian Association of Alberta argued that the Crown is a constant in the
context of treaties, the English Court of Appeal clearly rejected that argument,
holding that the Crown itself had evolved from an indivisible entity into many
separate Crowns within the Commonwealth. 7 Moreover, we have seen that
83
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Keewatin, supra note 7 at para 136.
Ibid, quoting from Canadian Western Bank vAlberta, [2007] 2 SCR 3 at para 23.
Treaty 3, supra note 2.
Keewatin, supra note 7 at para 136, quoted in greater length in text accompanying note 83 supra.
Compare McAteer v Canada (Attorney General) (2014), 121 OR (3d) 1 [McAteer], leave to appeal
dismissed [2014] SCCA 444, involving the requirement of an oath to "the Queen" to become
a Canadian citizen, at para 48, per Weiler JA for the Court: "The evolution of Canada from a
British colony into an independent nation and democratic constitutional monarchy must inform
the interpretation of the reference to the Queen in the citizenship oath. As Canada has evolved, the
symbolic meaning of the Queen in the oath has evolved."
Indian Association ofAlberta, supra note 31, was cited in Keewatin, supra note 7 at para 138, as
authority for the proposition that "treaty interpretation has to evolve along with the constitution,"
without reference to the English Court of Appeal's opinion that the meaning of the Crown has
evolved as well. However, more recently in McAteer the Court of Appeal cited Lord Denning's
judgment in Indian Association of Alberta as authority that the Crown is "separate and divisible
for each self-governing dominion or province or territory" (McAteer, supra note 86 at para 51,
quoting from IndianAssociation ofAlberta at 917). Delivering the unanimous judgment in McAteer,
Weiler JA at para 49 also agreed with the application judge's statement that "Her Majesty the
Queen in Right of Canada (or Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario or the other provinces),
as a governing institution, has long been distinguished from Elizabeth R. and her predecessors
as individual people." She continued at paras 50-51: "During the heyday of the Empire, British
constitutional theory saw the Crown as indivisible . . . . However, as Canada developed as an
independent federalist state, the conception of the Queen (commonly referred to as the Crown)
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the Supreme Court of Canada, in Mitchell, Osoyoos Indian Band, and Blueberry
River Indian Band, has treated the Crown as divisible. One would therefore
have thought the Supreme Court would have disagreed with the Ontario Court
of Appeal on this issue.
That is not what happened. The Supreme Court not only affirmed this
aspect of the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision, but went even further. As we
have seen, the Supreme Court agreed that Treaty 3 was with the Crown, not
with Canada, and that Ontario - and Ontario alone - has the constitutional
authority to exercise the taking-up power. But the Supreme Court also decided
an issue that the Court of Appeal had left unresolved, namely that section 91(24)
of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 and the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity"
do not prevent the Province from justifiably infringing the treaty right to hunt
and fish, which could happen if the taking up of lands left no meaningful scope
for the exercise of that right." In so deciding, the Supreme Court relied, without
discussion, on its own judgment in Tsilhqotin Nationofrom two weeks earlier,91
in which it overruled its decision in R. v Morri 92 on the protection provided to
treaty rights by section 91(24) and interjurisdictional immunity.93
But what is this entity, "the Crown," with whom both the Ontario
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court said the treaty had been made? We
have seen that the notion of the Crown as a single abstract entity with legal
personality as a corporation sole made some sense in England, but with the
creation of the Canadian federation in 1867 and the subsequent development
of the Commonwealth, the notion became conceptually and practically
unworkable. Lord Watson's reliance on the unity of the Crown in the Canadian
context in St. Catherine'sMillingin1888 was probably already an anachronism,
evolved . . . . Moreover, the Crown may for some purposes fall within provincial power under s.
92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, and for other purposes fall within federal power under s. 91. For
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the purposes of Canadian federalism, the Crown therefore cannot be viewed as a single indivisible
entity." Given the discrepancy between Keewatin and McAteer (decided just 18 months apart) on
the issue of the divisibility of the Crown, is it indiscreet to point out that none of the judges from
Keewatin sat on McAteer?
Briefly, this doctrine protects a core of federal jurisdiction under s 91(24) and other heads of federal
legislative authority from provincial laws, even in the absence of federal legislation occupying the
field: see Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 52 at 15-28 to 15-38.8.
Grassy Narrows FirstNation, supra note 1 at para 52: see text accompanying note 6 supra.
Supra note 21.
Grassy Narrows FirstNation, supra note 1 at para 53.
[2006] 2 SRC 915.
The Supreme Court's deviation in Tsilhqot'in Nation and GrassyNarrows FirstNation from earlier
precedents on the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity in the context of s
91(24) is discussed in Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Provinces after Tsilhqot'in Nation"
(2015) 71 Supreme Court L Rev (2d), forthcoming [McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Provinces"].
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but in any case by the time of the Statute of Westminster in 1931 the Crown
had clearly been divided into separate juristic entities, as acknowledged by the
English Court of Appeal in Indian Association ofAlberta. Within Canada this
separation, which should have operated at the federal and provincial levels
from the time of Confederation, is expressed by the terminology "the Crown
in right of Canada," "the Crown in right of Ontario," etc., and is evidenced
by division-of-powers litigation and federal-provincial agreements. 4 Yet Chief
Justice McLachlin concluded in Grassy Narrows First Nation that "[t]he treaty,
as discussed, was between the Crown - a concept that includes all government
power - and the Ojibway."95 The problem with this, in my view, is that the
Crown as a "concept that includes all government power" cannot have legal
personality in our federal system. So how could this conceptual entity be
party to a treaty? The Supreme Court nonetheless relied on the old notion of a
unified Crown from St. Catherine' Milling - when its application in Canada
already made little sense, as Maitland pointed out - and used it to justify an
interpretation of Treaty 3 today that flies in the face of the express words of the
Treaty."9

4. Conclusion
Our examination of the case law relating to the theory of the unity of the
Crown in the context of the Indigenous peoples of Canada reveals progression
from rigid application of the theory in St. Catherine' Milling, through explicit
rejection of the theory's applicability in the context of Canada's federal structure
94

95
96
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See Laskin, supra note 30 at 122; Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 52 at 10-3 n 5; Smith,
supra note 37 at 153. Compare Lordon, supra note 17 at 282-83. See e.g. An Agreement between
the Government of Canada and the Government of the Province New Brunswick respecting
Indian Reserves, 25 March 1958, confirmed by SC 1959, c 47, and SNB 1958, c 4. Section 3 of
the Agreement provides: "New Brunswick hereby transfers to Canada all rights and interests of
the Province in reserve lands except lands lying under public highways, and minerals." In Smith,
supra note 58, the Supreme Court apparently had no difficulty concluding that this Agreement
transferred legal title to reserve lands in New Brunswick from the provincial to the federal
government. For a traditional explanation of the legal nature of federal-provincial agreements,
see David W Mundell, "Legal Nature of Federal and Provincial Executive Governments: Some
Comments on Transactions Between Them" (1960) 2 Osgoode Hall LJ 56 at 70-75.
Grassy Narrows FirstNation, supra note 1 at para 39.
Interestingly, in its recent decision in McAteer, supra note 86, the Ontario Court of Appeal has
provided additional insight into its conception of "the Queen" (which Weiler JA at para 51 said
is "commonly referred to as the Crown"), in the context of the citizenship oath. Inter alia, Weiler
JA observed at para 54: "Although the Queen is a person, in swearing allegiance to the Queen of
Canada, the would-be citizen is swearing allegiance to a symbol of our form of government in
Canada. This fact is reinforced by the oath's reference to 'the Queen of Canada,' instead of 'the
Queen.' It is not an oath to a foreign sovereign. Similarly, in today's context, the reference in the
oath to the Queen of Canada's 'heirs and successors' is a reference to the continuity of our form of
government extending into the future."
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and independence from the United Kingdom in IndianAssociation ofAlberta, to
disregard of the theory's relevance in the context of transfers of reserve lands in
Osoyoos Indian Band and Blueberry River Indian Band. Leading constitutional
scholars generally concur in dismissing the theory's application within Canada.17
In 1969, Justice Bora Laskin, then a member of the Ontario Court of Appeal
and later Chief Justice of Canada, wrote:
Her Majesty has no personal physical presence in Canada . . . and only the
legal connotation, the abstraction that Her Majesty or the Crown represents,
needs to be considered for purposes of Canadian federalism . . . . Where it

is necessary to personify the state, whether it be Canada or a Province, the
common reference to the Crown has been modified by the addition of an
identifying phrase "in right of Canada" or in right of the particular Province.
This is recognition that it makes no sense juristically to insist that it is the same
Crown that is meant when in fact it is not Her Majesty who is involved.98

Similarly, Peter Hogg, in the first edition of his influential text, Constitutional
Law of Canada, wrote in 1977:
There is only one individual at any time who is the Queen (or King). The
Crown accordingly has a monolithic connotation, which has sometimes
been articulated in dicta such as that the Crown is "one and indivisible." For
nearly all purposes the idea of the Crown as one and indivisible is thoroughly
misleading .... In a federal system, such as Canadas, it is frequently necessary
to distinguish one government from another. The federal government is the
Crown in right of Canada (or the Dominion), of course, and each of the
provincial governments is the Crown in right of Ontario or whichever province
it may be. Each province, and the Dominion, has a separate legal existence,
evidenced by a separate treasury, separate property, separate employees,
separate courts, and a separate set of laws to administer."
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Contrast Mundell, supra note 94. Mundell provided a useful doctrinal description of the
application of the theory of the unity of the Crown (though he preferred the term "Her Majesty")
in Canada as of 1960, the purpose which he admitted was "purely explanatory": ibid at 56.
Laskin, supra note 30 at 118-19. See also the quotation accompanying note 30 supra, where Laskin
commented on the unreality of Lord Watson's views on the unity of the Crown in St. Catherine's
Milling (this part of Laskin's book was relied on extensively by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
McAteer, supra note 86 at paras 50-51). Later, Laskin CJC observed in Alberta v Canadian Transport
Commission, [1978] 1 SCR 61 at 71: "There may be something to be said for the view that, having
regard to the nature of Canada's federal system, the notion of the indivisibility of the Crown
should be abandoned. The Constitution of Canada distributes legislative power between a central
Parliament and provincial Legislatures and prerogative or executive power (which is formally vested
in the Queen) is similarly distributed to accord with the distribution of legislative power, thus
pointing to different executive authorities."
Peter W Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, Student Edition (Toronto: Carswell, 1977), 164.
Hogg, Monahan, and Wright, supra note 36 at 13-14, contains a very similar passage, while adding
at 15 that the usage "the Crown 'in right of' . . . is obviously suggestive of indivisibility, but the
suggestion must be resisted. Each government is a separate legal entity. In asking whether the
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Professor Hogg has maintained essentially the same position up to and including
the most recent update of the Looseleaf Edition of his text, with the addition of
discussion of the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Indian Association
ofAlberta for further support.100

-

-

The position stated by Justice Laskin and Professor Hogg makes
eminent good sense. As Hogg has maintained, in the Canadian context the
concept of a unified Crown is misleading and impractical. The reality is that a
single Crown no longer exists as a juristic person that is somehow different from
the governments that have legal rights and exercise constitutional powers in our
federal system. Instead, Canada and each of the ten provinces are separate juristic
entities with distinct legal personalities. The unified Crown is an abstraction
Maitland called it a legal fiction - that outlived its purpose as a juristic entity
long ago and should be relegated to legal history. So although one can still refer
to the Crown in general terms e.g. when speaking of the honour of the
Crown or the fiduciary obligations of the Crown - this does not mean that a
single juristic entity is meant. Instead, in these contexts the term encompasses
the Crown in all its separate manifestations in Canada.101 In specific instances,
one then has to proceed to identify which Crown is involved. In some cases, it
will be the Crown in right of Canada, 102 whereas in others it will be the Crown
in right of a province. 103 It is those specific, individual Crowns that have legal
personality, not "the Crown."to This separation was made conceptually possible
by the realization in the 1 6 ,h century that the King or Queen has two bodies
the natural body obviously cannot be divided, but the body politic can and has
been.10

100
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Crown in right of Ontario, for example, is liable under a contract, we are asking a question about
the legal duties of a legal person, the government of Ontario." See also Lordon, supra note 17 at
29-34, 293-306; Smith, supra 37 at 28-30, 183-84.
Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 52 at 10-2 to 10-3.
See Lordon, supra note 17 at 5-7.
See e.g. Mikisew Cree FirstNation, supra note 5, and Guerin, supra note 71, involving honour of the
Crown in right of Canada and federal fiduciary obligations respectively.
See e.g. Haida Nation v British Columbia (MinisterofForests), [2004] 3 SCR 511, and Taku River
Tlingit FirstNation v British Columbia (ProjectAssessment Director), [2004] 3 SCR 550, involving
honour of the Crown in right of British Columbia.
Contrast Mundell, supra note 94.
See note 17 supra and accompanying text. When Aboriginal peoples in Canada contend that their
treaties are agreements with the Queen, as argued in IndianAssociation ofAlberta, supra note 31,
they seem to mean the Queen and her successors as living persons. The notion that the Queen
is really two or more persons, and that their treaties are with the Queen as a body politic, may
not have been understood by people whose societies are kinship-based. Moreover, when Treaty
3 and the other numbered treaties of the 1870s were being negotiated, the treaty commissioners
frequently employed kinship language and represented the treaties as agreements with a personal
sovereign. An example is Alexander Morris's statement to the assembled chiefs during the Treaty
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What then is one to make of the Supreme Court's decision in Grassy
Narrows First Nation? Quite frankly, I think the Court reverted to unity of the
Crown in the treaty context in order to avoid concluding that Treaty 3 was
made with the Crown in right of Canada because the Court thought such a
conclusion might upset the balance of federalism. If the Treaty was with Canada
and the taking-up clause meant what it said, namely that the power to take
up Treaty 3 lands could be exercised only by or with the authorization of the
Dominion of Canada, this could have had serious implications for the Province
of Ontario's control over natural resource development. In my opinion, Grassy
Narrows First Nation and Tsilhqotin Nation are companion decisions in this
respect - recall that they were released just two weeks apart, and so no doubt
were being written by Chief Justice McLachlin at roughly the same time. As
mentioned earlier, Tsilhqot'in Nation reversed R. v Morriso6 on the protection
provided to treaty rights by section 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 and
the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. As Tsilhqotin Nation involved
Aboriginal title to land, the implications of the rejection of the application
of this doctrine are enormous - it means that provincial laws in relation to
resource development can infringe Aboriginal title, as long as the infringement
can be justified under the Sparrow test.10 7
So Grassy Narrows FirstNation and Tsilhqot'in Nation achieve the same
result: in both cases resource development is placed firmly within provincial
jurisdiction, regardless of whether the development impacts treaty rights
or Aboriginal rights and title. This result was achieved in Tsilhqot'in Nation
by rejecting the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.
Grassy Narrows First Nation applied this aspect of Tsilhqotin Nation, while
empowering Ontario to take up lands by deciding that Treaty 3 is with the
Crown, not Canada. Both decisions therefore favour provincial over federal
jurisdiction, a result that Canada was as eager as the provinces of Ontario
3 negotiations, in Morris, supranote 2 at 58: "I told you I was to make the treaty on behalf of our
Great Mother the Queen, and I feel it will be for your good and your children's . . . . We are all
children of the same Great Spirit, and are subject to the same Queen." Again, at the beginning
of the Treaty 6 negotiations in 1876, Morris said: "You are, like me and my friends who are with
me, children of the Queen" (ibid at 199). Regarding Treaty 6, Elder Alma Kytwayhat stated that
the Queen "offered to be our mother and to love us in the way we want to live": quoted in Harold
Cardinal and Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is 7hat Our Peoples
Will One Day Be Clearly RecognizedAs Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000), 34.
See also JR (Jim) Miller, "The Aboriginal Peoples and the Crown," in D Michael Jackson and
Philippe Lagass6, eds, Canada and the Crown: Essays on ConstitutionalMonarchy (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012), 255-69; Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay:
Treaties andAboriginalRights in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 77-99.
106 Supra note 92.
107 R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075. See McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Provinces", supra note 93.
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and British Columbia to achieve, as evidenced by the fact that, as a party
in these cases, Canada supported the provinces on division-of-powers and
interjurisdictional immunity.108 The losers on the jurisdictional issues in each
case were First Nations, whose rights are now subject to justifiable infringement
by the provinces.1 0
From the case law, it is thus hard to avoid the conclusion that unity of
the Crown tends to get invoked by the courts when it works against Indigenous
claimants, but is disregarded when it would assist them. In this context, at least,
one has to agree with the Beatles that "Her Majesty ... changes from day to
day," 110 depending on whose interests are at stake.

See Respondent's factum on Behalf of the Attorney General of Canada, in Tsilhqot'in Nation, SCC
file no. 34986: online <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/factums-memoires/34986/FMO30_Respondent
Attorney-General-of-Canada.pdf>, especially paras 86-110; Factum of the Respondent (Third
Party) the Attorney General of Canada, in Grassy Narrows FirstNation, SCC file no. 35379: online
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/factums-memoires/35379/FMO30_RespondentAttorney-General-ofCanada.pdf>, especially paras 56, 79. 89-103. I find it disturbing that the Attorney General of
Canada usually supports the provinces against First Nations in these kinds of cases, even when it
means sacrificing federal jurisdiction (does this ever happen in other division-of-powers cases?), but
this is a subject for another article.
109 Treaty rights, however, may still be protected against infringing provincial laws by s 88 of the
Indian Act, RSC 1985, c 1-5, as the Supreme Court's judgments in Tsilhqot'in Nation and Grassy
Narrows First Nation did not address this issue. For cases holding that s 88 provides treaty rights
with broad protection against provincial laws, see R v White and Bob (1964), 50 DLR (2d) 613
(BCCA), aff'd (1964) 52 DLR (2d) 481 (SCC); Simon v 7he Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 387; R v Sioui,
[1990] 1 SCR 1025. These unanimous decisions were not mentioned, let alone overruled, in
Tsilhqot'in Nation and Grassy Narrows FirstNation.
110 I would like to thank my daughter Katie for rekindling my appreciation of the Beatles, leading
me to make this link between their lyrics and what Paul McHugh and Lisa Ford have termed
"the shapeshifting Crown" in their chapter, "Settler Sovereignty and the Shapeshifting Crown,"
in Lisa Ford and Tim Rowse, eds, Between Indigenous and Settler Governance (Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge, 2013), 23.
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